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This We'll Defend:



Why the United States needs the Army to defend its vital interests and how the Army should adapt to meet future challenges

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DoD force-sizing scenarios presumed a favorable security environment on land

- **The 2014 defense strategy requires the joint force capacity to:**
 - Decisively defeat a regional aggressor in a multi-phase joint campaign
 - Successfully deter aggression in a second region by denying adversary objectives or imposing unacceptable costs
- **To meet fiscal constraints, the Army is currently being sized to:**
 - Defeat a regional power in a short conflict with allies providing ground forces
 - Provide limited security and enablers in a short conflict that relies on air-naval power to deny enemy objectives
- **DoD force-sizing scenarios *do not account for* :**
 - Deterring and defeating Russian aggression against NATO
 - Stabilizing Korea, securing WMD, shaping China and supporting transition

Are these scenarios and assumptions still representative of future threats and defense missions?

The Security Environment has changed...

- **New and enduring challenges to U.S. vital interests include:**
 - Russia invaded Ukraine and presents a long-term security challenge in Europe
 - China presents “gray zone” challenges over territories administered by U.S. allies
 - North Korea may provoke an escalatory war or implode with “loose nukes”
 - Iran supports Shia militias in proxy conflicts with Sunni states
 - ISIS is destabilizing Iraq and Syria, causing refugees, mass atrocities and terrorism



Problem #1: Russia can seize the Baltic States

- **Bottom Line:**

- As presently postured, NATO cannot defend the Baltic States in a short-warning attack by a Russian force of 22-27 battalions

- **Wargame Outcomes:**

- Russia quickly overruns the Baltic forces
- Effects of airpower are limited by modern Russian IADs, sortie rates & legacy munitions
- Moving tactically at ~5 mph, Russia can isolate Riga & Tallinn in 36-60 hours

- **Strategic Consequences:**

- Conduct a delayed counter-offensive, risking nuclear escalation and high casualties
- Effectively cede control of the Baltic States, using economic sanctions to impose costs



- “Best case” deployment from current posture
- ~45 days to deploy leading edge of NATO armor

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US & NATO leaders should balance the costs & risk of

forces


RAND Scenario: Defend the Baltic States

- **Operational concept and capability gaps:**

- An operational concept to defeat a great power with modern A2AD and sensor-strike systems
- US JFLCC, Corps & Division HQs
- C4ISR “plug” for NATO allies
- Armored combined arms maneuver
- Theater & Operational Sustainment
- Army SEAD vs. Russian IADs
- Army counter-fire vs. Russian MRL
- Air Defense and Electronic Warfare

- **Critical posture gaps:**

- **To prevent the rapid fait accompli:**
1 x Armored Division (3 ABCTs + enablers)
plus 3 IBCTs and 1 SBCT on 10 days warning
- **To relieve forces and restore LOCs:**
9-12 Armored BCTs that can counter-attack on
20 days warning (= D+10)



- **Evaluation**

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Location:

- Baltics
- Poland
- Germany

Method:

- Forward Based
- Rotational Presence
- Pre-Positioned Stocks

Units:


- 1 Partial Division
- 1 Full Division
- 2 Full Divisions

Standards:

- “Go to War” APS
- Full Unit Activity Set
- Partial Training Set

Problem #2: Deterring China with less risk

- **Military-Technical Problem:**
 - Increasing effective range of China's A2AD system threatens U.S. carriers, air bases, and short-range tactical aircraft in the near seas
- **Offensive Solution:**
 - “Breaking the kill chain” by destroying China's A2AD on the mainland risks escalation and encourages both sides to strike first
- **Defensive Solution:**
 - Employing “Blue A2AD” to deny China the ability to project power over water if it chooses aggression incurs less risk
- **“Blue A2AD” Key Capabilities:**
 - C4ISR, submarines, anti-ship missiles, air and missile defense, operational fires, a ground defense by allies, and theater logistics



RAND Scenario: Deter China with Blue A2AD

- **Army Operational Roles to Deter China:**

- Mil-Mil Engagement
- Building Partner Capacity
- Dynamic Security Cooperation
- Show of Force to Support Diplomacy
- Deploy Flexible Deterrent Options
- Integrated Air and Missile Defense
- Logistics Support to the Joint Force
- Defensive Operations
- Integrating partner land-based anti-ship missiles in joint and combined operations

- **Critical posture or capability gaps:**

- US JFLCC HQs (USARPAC OCP)
- C4ISR “plug” for Asian allies
- Theater Air & Missile Defense
- Long-range fires
- Sustain dispersed air bases

- **Evaluate force posture options:**



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Location:

- Japan
- Philippines
- Korea

Method:

- Forward Based
- Rotational Presence
- Pre-Positioned Stocks

Units:

- ADA & Fires Bns
- ENG & CSS Bns
- Anti-Ship Missiles?

Standards:

- “Go to War” APS
- Full Unit Activity Set
- Partial Training Set

Problem #3: Escalatory Conflict in Korea

- **Bottom Line:**


- U.S. forces are not postured to conduct rapid offensive operations to eliminate the artillery threat to Seoul or secure WMD in Korea

- **Changing Threats:**

- U.S. posture was based on a ROK *defense* against invasion, allowing months to deploy
- More likely the DPRK will spark an escalatory conflict including strikes on Seoul or implode with “loose nukes” and other WMD systems
- The ROK Army lacks key capabilities to conduct and sustain rapid *offensive* operations

- **Strategic Consequences:**

- Even if airstrikes reduce the DPRK rate of fire by 50%, that means 250,000 rounds per hour



If the consequences of a delayed response are unacceptable, policymakers should consider alternative posture options

RAND Scenario: Rapid Response in Korea

- **Critical capability gaps in Korea:**

- US Corps HQs
- C4ISR “plug” for ROK allies
- Armored combined arms maneuver
- Theater & Operational Sustainment
- Army SEAD vs. NK IADs
- Army counter-fire vs. NK long-range MRL
- Engineers (mobility, river crossing)
- WMD Elimination Task Forces



- **Critical posture gaps in Korea:**

- **To support the initial ROK offensive:**
C4ISR, ATACMs, MLRS, AH-64
- **To exploit ROK penetration at the DMZ:**
2 x Divisions (4 ABCTs, 2 SBCTs, 2 IBCTs + full set of enablers) within 30-45 days

- **Evaluate force posture options:**

Operational Challenge:

- Attack a deliberate defense in depth
- In mountainous terrain
- With wire, mine, river obstacles
- Covered by direct & indirect fire
- Including use of chemical weapons
- Without effective counter-fire solution

Location:

- Korea

Method:

- Forward Based
- Rotational Presence
- Pre-Positioned Stocks


Units:

- 1 Full Division
- 2 Full Divisions

Standards:

- “Go to War” APS Full Unit Activity Set
- Partial Training Set

Conclusion: Remain a Full-Spectrum



The **mission** of the United States Army is to:

- Deter and defeat aggression in Asia, the Middle East and Europe
- Counter terrorism and WMD proliferation
- Promote regional security and respond in small-scale contingencies
- Defend the homeland and support civil authorities



Adapt the Army to meet future challenges:

- DOTML solution to defeat Russian A2AD
- DOTML solution for Blue A2/AD to deter China
- DOTML solution for WMD elimination in Korea
- DOTML solution for a joint UW campaign in Syria
- Retain modular force but clarify corps & division ops
- Align units for COCOM contingency plans
- Implement a Mission Readiness Model
- Set theaters for future expeditionary

Address the Strategy-Resource Mismatch

- **Capacity:** The programmed Army is too small to deter Russia by defending the Baltics if North Korea implodes or sparks an escalatory conflict
 - *Pause the drawdown at AC 490k, ARNG 350k and USAR 205k*
- **Concept & Capability:** The Army needs an operational concept and key capabilities to counter high-end threats with modern A2AD and sensor-strike systems
 - *Priorities include interoperable C4ISR, long-range counter-fire & SEAD, and SHORAD*
- **Posture:** The Army lacks the forward posture to deny a Russian fait accompli in the Baltics or quickly neutralize the artillery threat to Seoul and eliminate WMD in Korea
 - *Cannot meet deterrence and response requirements through rotational presence alone*

- **Readiness:** The Army remains on “the ragged edge of readiness” (only 32% ready)
 - *Improve readiness now and apportion Army forces in CONUS to priority COCOM RAND plans*
 - *Identify the “WARTRACE” to give every unit a real-world mission & METI*



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Linking Strategy & Army Force Planning

National Perspective

What the Army needs to do

- Role in securing U.S. interests
- Role in countering threats
- Role in the defense strategy
- Role in defense missions

Strategic & Military Risk

- 4 National leaders set priorities, make strategic choices, and refine the strategy by accepting or mitigating different types of risk
- 3 Analysis of Army resource implications and options for force structure, readiness and modernization identifies risk to COCOM missions and Army forces

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Planning

Regional



Operational Risk

1 Apply national strategic guidance to identify specific interests, current threats, future challenges and Army roles & missions in each COCOM AOR

2

Realistic analysis of strategic requirements drives strategic choices about Army future concepts & capabilities

Institutional

How the Army does it

- Future concepts
- AC/RC roles
- Operating force mix
- Generating force capability
- Appropriate end-strength
- Regional alignment
- Global force management policies
- Readiness process & goals
- Modernization to pace future threats
- Maintain a quality volunteer force

Force Management & Future Challenges Risk

Budget / risk trades

The Army Operating Concept

Generic Environment

- Increased momentum of human interaction
- Capable, elusive enemies
- Potential overmatch
- WMD proliferation
- Space & cyberspace
- Dense urban areas
- Technology transfer
- Ubiquitous media

General Concepts

Elements:

- Engage regionally
- Respond globally
- Develop situational awareness
- **Conduct joint combined arms operations**
- Establish & maintain security
- Consolidate gains
- Sustain operations
- Respond to and mitigate crises in the homeland
- Ensure institutional & operational synergy
- Develop innovative leaders & maximize human performance

General Problem

To meet the demands of the future strategic environment in 2025 and beyond, how does the Army conduct joint operations **promptly in sufficient scale and for ample duration** to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars?

Tenets:

- Initiative
- **Simultaneity**
- **Depth**
- Adaptability
- Endurance
- **Lethality**
- Mobility
- Innovation

Core Competencies:

- Shape the environment
- Set the theater
- Project national power
- **Combined arms maneuver**
- **Wide area security**
- Cyber Operations
- Special operations

All good principles, but it remains unclear. . .

How, exactly, do they solve real-world Joint problems?

Strategic Context for Army Posture Decisions

Besides budget reductions, what strategic assumptions and scenarios have driven U.S. Army forward presence and global equipping strategy since 1991?

Strategic Assumptions

- Russia is a partner not a threat
- Russia is a declining power; the Europeans should defend themselves
- No directed DoD mission or force-sizing scenario to deter Russia
- China is mainly an air-naval problem
- The ROK Army can defend to defeat an (unlikely) DPRK conventional invasion
- US has time to deploy offensive forces from CONUS
- Iraq is stable after US withdrawal
- Al Qaeda is on the path to defeat
- The US will withdraw from AFG
- Airpower/SOF can contain ISIS
- Air & naval power can deter Iran



DoD & Army Decisions

- Dismantle POMCUS sites
- Withdraw 1AD, 1ID, 3 AD, 8 ID
- Retain 173 ABN & 2 CR
- Minimum logistics footprint
- Resource ABCT Unit Activity Set
- Partially resource 94th AMDC
- Withdraw I Corps
- Reduce 2 ID
- Only 1 rotational ABCT from CONUS
- Minimum APS in theater
- Residual force in Afghanistan
- Train & advise force in Iraq
- Rotational BCT in Kuwait
- Minimum APS in theater
- Seen as a "bill-payer?"

Russian & Chinese Concepts

	Russia	China
Strategic Concept	Ambiguous Warfare <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blurring the lines of war and peace... • Using all instruments of power... • With conventional force in the guise of peacekeeping to achieve final success 	Unrestricted Warfare <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “The battlefield is everywhere” ... • Combined use of diplomatic, information, economic, financial, military, non-traditional and cyber power
Operational Concept	Counter-Intervention <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A2AD capabilities to deny U.S. air superiority and control of the near seas • Sensor-targeting-strike to destroy HVTs and raise the costs of intervention 	Counter-Intervention <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A2AD capabilities to deny U.S. air superiority and control of the near seas • Sensor-targeting-strike to destroy HVTs and raise the costs of intervention • “System of systems” for intelligence collection, fusion, dissemination and decisions that integrate joint operations
Key Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SS-26 Iskander (5-7m CEP @ 500 km) • SS-N-27 Klub ASM (300 – 600 km) • S-400/SA-21 SAMs (135 - 400 km) • BM-29 Grad (250 km) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DF-15 TBM (5-10m CEP @ 600 km) • DF-21D Ballistic ASM (1,450 km) • S-400/SA-21 SAMs (135 - 400 km) • WS-2C Rocket Artillery (350 km)


How can the U.S. defeat their strategy by countering all forms of coercion?

How can the Joint Force neutralize or marginalize their A2AD

Problem: Exploit the Overloaded Defender

A chess tactic to overload the defensive piece by giving it a new defensive assignment which it cannot complete without abandoning its original defensive assignment.

Krasenkow vs. Karpov, 2003



The **White rook at f-1 must:**

- 1. Defend the pawn at f3 to prevent checkmate by the Black queen.**
- 2. Defend the “back rank” (row 1) to prevent checkmate by the Black queen or rook.**

It cannot accomplish two missions simultaneously.

Therefore Black moves rook ♖ e-1, wins material and can eventually force mate.

Conduct geo-political probing and/or opportunistic aggression to exploit the fact the U.S. Army will be too small to conduct a new operation without sacrificing success or credible deterrence elsewhere.



8 AC ABCTs (the only units with tactical overmatch to defeat conventional forces in open & urban terrain) must:

- 1. Deter and defeat aggression in Korea.**
- 2. Deter and defeat aggression in the Middle East.**
- 3. Deter and defeat aggression in Europe.**
- 4. Deter and defeat a state sponsor of catastrophic terrorism.**
- 5. Eliminate WMD in failing states to prevent proliferation.**

DoD priorities allow the U.S. to enjoy a 20:1 advantage in aircraft carriers and “advanced stealth fighters,” but ground forces must fight outnumbered in extended deployments during more likely conflicts on land.